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Abstract
In many countries, labor courts play a central role in the determination of firing costs by mon-
itoring and supervising the procedures for dismissals, and, eventually, deciding severance pay-
ments mandated by the employment protection legislation (EPL). To get some insights about 
the impact of labor courts on effective firing costs, we explore a new database that contains 
information on labor courts’ intervention in firings before and after the implementation of 
significant EPL reforms modifying severance payments and procedures for dismissals. Our 
results suggest that labor court rulings on economic dismissals did not fully translate the 
reduction of firing costs mandated by the new EPL to effective firing costs.
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1 Introduction
Labor market institutions are considered key determinants of the functioning of the labor 
market and, hence, of economic performance (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, Botero et al., 
2005, Turrini et al., 2014, OECD, 2019). A less studied issue is, however, how enforcement of 
regulation by the judicial system affects labor market outcomes.
In the case of employment protection legislation (EPL), labor courts play a central role. 
EPL mandates procedural rules for the resolution of firings. These rules create some room for 
strategic behavior by employers and fired employees, which is even more pronounced when, 
as happens in many countries, there is the possibility of settlement before labor courts inter-
vene. Hence, the intervention of labor courts determines effective firing costs, both for cases 
settled out-of-the courts and those ruled by judges (see Daughety and Reinganum, 2012). 
In sum, effective firing costs depend both on severance payments established by EPL and costs 
associated with litigation.
Judges are neither neutral nor unbiased agents, but rather they seem to decide on labor 
conflicts with some “social motivation” (Bornstein and Miller, 2009; Posner, 2010; Feld and 
Voigt, 2003; Muñoz Aranguren, 2011; Danziger et al., 2011), which widens the scope for stra-
tegic behavior by employers and dismissed employees. For instance, in Italy, there is some 
association between local labor market conditions, such as the unemployment rate, and labor 
courts’ decisions (Macis, 2001, Ichino et al., 2003); in Germany, even after controlling for the 
fact that court activity varies systematically with the political leaning of the government that 
appoints judges, there is a significant positive relation between court activity and unemploy-
ment (Berger and Neugart, 2011); in the UK, unemployment and firms’ bankruptcy rates seem 
also to be statistically associated with the probability of judges deciding in favor of dismissed 
employees (Marinescu, 2011); and in Spain, labor courts’ rulings in dismissal conflicts are 
similar across neighboring provinces suggesting that judges are subject to some “peer effects” 
(Martín-Román et al., 2015).
With the goal of reducing firing costs in Spain, two EPL reforms in 2010 and 2012 changed 
procedural rules for economic dismissals (mainly by widening the definition of “fair economic 
dismissals”) and reduced severance payments for unfair dismissals.1 The aim of this paper was 
to gauge to what extent changes in firing procedures mandated by these EPL reforms translated 
into changes in the effective costs of economic dismissals.
More broadly, the paper provides some empirical evidence to the view that the effects 
of EPL reforms aimed at reducing firing costs may depend not only on mandated sever-
ance payments but also on labor courts’ rulings on firing conflicts and expectations of the 
parties on these rulings. We do so by performing comparisons of the likelihood of set-
tlements and labor courts’ rulings before and after the EPL reforms. Both differences are 
estimated conditioning on a set of covariates, mostly related to local labor market condi-
tions, which control for the incidence and the selection of dismissal cases brought to labor 
courts’ resolutions. We find that (i) settlements increased after the reforms (in particular, 
after 2012) and (ii) despite the widening in the definition of fair economic dismissals, the 
probability of a labor court ruling a firing as fair did not significantly increase. Therefore, 
the main effects of the Spanish EPL reforms on effective firing costs took place through the 
1 Labour Reform Law of 2010, Royal-Decree-Law of 2011, and Labour Reform Law 2012.
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reduction of severance payments, not as a consequence of the changes in procedural rules 
for economic dismissals.
First, we describe the particular features of Spanish EPL and its reforms in 2010 and 
2012, and advance some propositions regarding the implications of the EPL reforms for settle-
ments and labor court decisions (Section 2). Empirical analysis of these implications is given in 
Section 3. In the Appendix, we lay off a theoretical model of the determinants of effective firing 
costs that illustrates the main mechanisms we have in mind to rationalize propositions and to 
interpret empirical results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 EPL: severance payments and procedural rules
2.1 Institutional framework
In Spain, terminations of regular employment contracts have to be justified either by the lack 
of performance of the employee (disciplinary layoffs) or by economic, technological, or orga-
nizational reasons (economic dismissals). Before 2010, economic dismissals were considered 
to be justified only in very restrictive cases and exclusively as a measure of last resource. A fair 
economic dismissal required the existence of negative economic conditions, but the law did 
not clarify what “negative conditions” meant, so the ambiguity of the definition gave judges 
a great deal of discretion. In 2010, there was a substantial extension of the conditions under 
which economic dismissals were justified, such as the incidence of current or anticipated losses, 
and a persistent decline in revenues that could jeopardize either firm’s economic viability or 
employment. The labor market reform of 2012 made further progress on the clarification of 
what negative economic causes meant referring to situations in which “for three consecutive 
quarters the level of revenues or sales of the company was lower than in the same quarters of 
the previous year”.
On the other hand, disciplinary layoffs are considered to be fair only in the cases of mis-
conduct or lack of adaptation of the employee to the job tasks. Spanish EPL reforms in 2010 and 
2012 did not substantially change the definition of fair disciplinary layoffs.
Fired employees may appeal to a labor court. In contrast with other countries, Spanish 
judges are not entitled to establish severance payments according to the characteristics of each 
individual case but only to declare the dismissal fair, unfair, or null. An out-of-court settlement 
stage prior to the file of the claim at the labor court is compulsory.
Employees dismissed under fair economic reasons are entitled to a severance pay of 
20 days’ wages per year of seniority, with a maximum of 12 months’ wages. Employees laid off 
for fair disciplinary reasons do not receive severance pay. EPL reforms in 2010 and 2012 did not 
change the amount of severance pay for fair dismissals. If either the economic dismissal or the 
disciplinary layoff is ruled out unfair, firms either had to pay 45 days’ wages per year of senior-
ity with a maximum of 42 months’ wages or had to reinstate the worker. After 2012, severance 
pay for all unfair dismissals/layoffs was reduced to 33 days’ wages per year of seniority with a 
maximum of 24 months’ wages.
Some employees (i.e., pregnant employees, employees enjoying reduced working time in 
order to take care of a child, trade union officials, employees who have filed a claim against 
the company, among others) are further protected against unfair dismissals/layoffs, so that 
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firing them could be declared as null/void, and the employees are entitled to reinstatement 
and interim wages (those corresponding to the period between the dates of dismissal and 
reinstatement). Moreover firings may be ruled as null if there is discrimination (a violation 
of the fundamental rights of the employee) or breach of union rights. Hence, the termination 
of employment contracts under these circumstances implies specific negotiations, which can 
result in the payment of very high compensations.2 Nevertheless, there are few cases of this 
nature brought to labor courts (see Palomo Balda, 2013).
Before 2012, the employer was entitled to dismiss an employee recognizing unilaterally its 
“unfairness” (termination without cause). Thus, termination was effective on the same date the 
dismissal was initiated and after the payment of the full severance for unfair dismissal. Hence, 
labor authorities (either judicial or administrative) did not intervene (this was usually called 
“express dismissal”, despido exprés in Spanish).3 The cost advantages of the so-called express 
dismissal for the employer were twofold. First, it avoided the red tape costs of legal proceed-
ings. Second, it eliminated the payment of interim wages (salarios de tramitación) when the 
labor court ruled the dismissal unfair. After 2012, the so-called express dismissal was elimi-
nated. Thus, the labor court intervention could no longer be avoided (in case of no out-of-court 
settlement), and interim wages for unfair dismissals and layoffs were reintroduced.4
Figure 1 sketches these firing regulations. Since the legal procedures for disciplinary 
layoffs were simpler and severance pay in case of unfair dismissal was the same than under 
economic dismissals, employers most frequently initiate firings alleging disciplinary causes. 
During 1984–2010, about 70% of dismissal cases resolved by labor judges’ rulings were declared 
unfair, with only a few of them being declared null.
It is also important to bear in mind that there are two alternative ways to terminate an 
employment contract besides individual firings. Since 1984, Spanish policy-makers, facing strong 
opposition to change EPL under regular employment contracts, introduced employment flexi-
bility at the margin by creating a wide array of “atypical” contracts.5 Regulation of these types of 
contracts changed several times and in fundamental ways, but segmentation between permanent 
and temporary employees, which began in the late 1980s, has prevailed since then. While regular 
employees are entitled the right to go to court to appealing the cause of the dismissal and may get 
higher severance payments in the case of unfair dismissals, temporary employees did not have 
the right to appeal the termination of their contracts. Hence, employers use fixed-term contract 
and other kinds of temporary contracts (nowadays amounting to more than 25% of employ-
ment) to buffer against negative shocks leading to downsizing of their labor force (Costain et al., 
2010). Additionally, economic dismissals may be implemented collectively, and it is obliged to 
do so when they affect to more than 10% of the firm’s labor force in a given quarter. Firing costs 
under collective dismissals are typically higher than for individual dismissals/layoffs.
2 In order to avoid legal proceedings, it is common to reach agreements of severance compensations between 50 and 
60 days of salary per year of service, which are much higher than the ones stated by EPL.
3 Nevertheless, the dismissed employee could still challenge the employer’s decision before labor courts by claiming that 
the dismissal was null/void.
4 If the court ruling is notified exceeding 90 days since the lawsuit has been filed, the employer may claim from the 
Spanish Government the reimbursement of interim wages corresponding to the excess of that period (sentence of the 
Supreme Court of Spain of October 22, 2009).
5 See Bentolila et al. (2012). There is an extensive literature documenting the negative effects of dualism in the Spanish 
labor market (among others, García-Serrano, 1998; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Bentolila et al., 2008; and Wölfl and 
Mora-Sanguinetti, 2012). For a recent survey, see Bentolila et al. (2019).
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2.2 Some hypotheses on the effects of EPL reforms on litigation
Given the Spanish institutional framework, employers take three decisions when considering 
firings: (i) when to initiate a firing, (ii) whether to justify the firing as an economic dismissal 
or as a disciplinary layoff (notice that the employer could initiate a firing as a disciplinary lay-
off even if the true cause is economic and vice versa; we will refer to these cases as disguised 
dismissals), and (iii) under what circumstances to reach a settlement before the labor court 
ruling. Similarly, the dismissed employee also has to decide whether to reach a settlement or 
to litigate.6 Finally, judges rule those cases that are not settled following the EPL mandate. For 
employer and employee decisions, expectations about the sign of labor court rulings (fair or 
unfair) play a crucial role. For the employer, these expectations determine when a settlement 
is less costly, the relative cost of initiating the firing as a economic dismissal versus as a disci-
plinary layoff, and, hence, effective firing costs, which, themselves, determine when to initiate 
a firing. Similarly, the expectations of the fired employee on the labor court ruling determine 
his or her acceptance of a settlement.
There is a large literature on settlements and litigation, developed after the seminal 
work by Priest and Klein (1984) who argued that, because of selection effects, the per-
centage of litigated cases won by plaintiffs will not vary with legal standards. Thus, EPL 
reforms would not have any effect on the proportion of labor court ruling in dismissals/ 
layoff conflicts. However, a more formal analysis rejects the so-called “No Inference 
Hypothesis”: Klerman and Lee (2014) concluded that “even taking selection effects into 
account, one may be able to make valid inferences from the percentage of plaintiff trial 
victories, because selection effects are partial”. They also proved that, under plausible con-
ditions, a change in the law ought to increase labor court rulings in favor of the party that 
wins more from it. Hence, changes in legal standards affect both the incentives to litigate 
and the expectations of the agents of outcomes of litigation, but not the extent to eliminate 
any effect on labor court rulings.
In the Appendix, we formally lay out a simple model of firing conflicts, similar to Klerman 
et al. (2018) but with some modifications to adapt it to the Spanish institutional context. From 
simple analysis of the comparative statics of the model, we conjecture the following effects of 
the Spanish labor market reforms on settlements and labor court rulings.
Proposition 1 Reducing severance payments and red tape costs for fair economic dismissals 
leads to more firings initiated as economic dismissals and to less firings disguised as disciplinary 
layoffs, and diminishes effective firing costs of truthful dismissals. Assuming that judges’ behavior 
and employers’ and workers’ expectations on the probability of ruling economic dismissals as fair 
are unchanged, the incidence of settlements does not change and the proportion of labor court 
rulings declaring firings as fair increases.
Proposition 2 Reducing severance payments and red tape for unfair dismissals leads to 
more firings disguised as disciplinary layoffs, and diminishes effective firing costs of truthful and 
untruthful dismissals. Assuming that judges’ behavior and employers’ and workers’ expectations 
on the probability of fair rulings are unchanged, the incidence of settlements does not change, and 
the proportion of labor court rulings declaring firings as fair decreases.
6 After the firing is initiated by the employer, the dismissed employee has to decide to appeal or not to a labor court. Since 
the cost of doing so is almost nil and the expected gains strictly positive, this decision is trivial.
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Proposition 3 Widening the fair causes of economic dismissals yields more firings being ini-
tiated as economic dismissals, and to less disguised dismissals as disciplinary layoffs, decreases the 
incidence of settlements and effective firing costs for truthful economic dismissals, and increases 
the likelihood of a fair ruling. Settlements are less likely insofar as employers update upward their 
expectations on the probability of fair rulings, while the update in workers’ expectations is likely 
to be smaller because of asymmetric information about firm’s profits.
Proposition 4 Lower firm profitability leads to more economic dismissals be initiated as 
such, and to less firings disguised as disciplinary layoffs, and lower effective firing costs. Settle-
ments are less likely insofar as employers update upward their expectations on the probability of 
fair rulings, and worker’s update in their workers’ expectation is likely to be smaller because of 
asymmetric information about firm’s profits.
Proposition 5 Worsening of local labor market conditions leads to less economic dismissals 
be initiated as such and to more disguised dismissals as disciplinary layoffs and raises effective 
firing costs. It also leads to less disciplinary layoffs, since workers shirk less when alternative 
employment opportunities decline. Settlements are unchanged insofar as updates of probabilities 
of a fair ruling are the same for employers and for workers.
In what follows, we turn to the data available to provide either confirmation or rejection 
of propositions above.
3 EPL reforms, settlements, and labor court rulings
3.1 Data
There are 345 labor courts operating in Spain. Geographical distribution is uneven and largely 
reflects population and firm density. Thus, there are 44 courts in the province of Barcelona, 
43 in the province of Madrid, and only one or two in other 11 provinces.7 Each labor court is 
served by a single judge, and there are 348 court clerks.8
Statistical information about EPL enforcement is extremely scarce.9 With information on 
labor court activity provided by the Spanish General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General 
del Poder Judicial, henceforth CGPJ), we constructed a new database that allows to identify 
some of the determinants of labor court rulings. Our database is composed of 154,962 obser-
vations over the period 2004Q1–2015Q2.
The unit of observation is the labor court. Data include labor court’s rulings on firing 
conflicts, i.e., if it was resolved in favor of the plaintiff (the employee) or the defendant 
(the employer) and refers to individual dismissals ruled by the first instance of the labor 
jurisdiction.10 Unfortunately, we cannot observe whether litigation was over an economic 
7 There are 50 provinces corresponding to the Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS3) level of 
disaggregation by Eurostat.
8 This circumstance is relatively exceptional in an international context, since it is only found in three other OECD 
countries, Portugal, Turkey and Chile (see OECD, 2013).
9 International surveys (CEPEJ, 2018; the OECD Civil Justice Project; Palumbo et al., 2013; or the World Bank Doing 
Business) provide some information, mostly of qualitative nature, about labor court intervention on firings conflicts.
10 Dismissed workers can only claim against the employer at a first-instance labor court located in the province where 
he or she is employed. If there are several labor courts in the province, workers cannot choose among them since 
conflicts are assigned according to predetermined rules. The rulings of first-instance labor courts may be appealed, but 
appeals are infrequent. Thus, by restricting our analysis to the first-instance labor court rulings, we are not excluding a 
significant number of cases that could be overturned at higher instances.
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Figure 1 Layoff procedure in the Spanish labor jurisdiction.
The employee disagrees with the 





The employee files a claim in 




Trial (ruling by a labor 
judge) (d)
Dismissal considered "fair" 
(resolved against the 
employee)
Dismissal considered "unfair"
(resolved in favour of the 
employee)
Dismissal considered "null"
Case withdrawal or similar 
conclusions of the procedure 
(formal failures, tacit 
withdrawal) (e)
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Notes:
a.  Out-of-court settlements are resolved in Spain by the “MAC” units (“Mediation, Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation Units”). The majority of out-of-court settlements resolved with an 
agreement between the employer and the employee end up with the effective firing of 
the employee. Settlements ended without an agreement are the main group of dismissal 
conflicts which arrive to the labor courts. Following the data of the Ministry of Employ-
ment and Social Security, there was a total of 220,095 out-of-court settlements in 2014, 
of which 101,426 ended with agreement between the employer and the employee.
b.  In 2014, the number of dismissals resolved at the labor court was 118,225. This amount is 
calculated by adding the number of pre-trial settlements with agreement, the dismissals 
finally ruled by a labor court, and the number of cases withdrawn (including tacit with-
drawals and voluntary dismissal of action by the parties).
c.  The number of pre-trial layoff settlements in 2014 was 48,508.
d.  In 2014, the number of dismissals resolved at the trial level in the labor courts was 42,992, 
of which a 78% were dismissals ruled as “unfair” (in favor of the employee).
e.  In 2014, 26,725 dismissals were withdrawn (thus, they were not resolved by a judge in a 
trial) as a result of formal failures, tacit withdrawals, and voluntary dismissal of action 
by the parties.
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dismissal or a disciplinary layoff. Information on employer/employee’s characteristics is not 
available. As for labor courts’ characteristics, we observe the type of judge ruling on the 
dismissal conflict, that is, whether he or she is assigned to a particular court or appointed as 
a temporary replacement, reserve or substitute of the former. Additionally, we also compute 
a measure of congestion at labor courts.11
As for settlements, they take place at two stages. First, there is an out-of-court settlement 
stage that is compulsory at the so-called mediation, arbitration and conciliation units before 
the file of the claim in the labor court. Second, settlements may also occur at the labor courts 
before the judge’s ruling. For each labor court, we observe a settlement ratio computed as the 
proportion of settlements within all the firing cases brought at labor courts.
Since local labor conditions affect the number of firing conflicts and labor court rul-
ings (see the Appendix), we also collect information on the provincial unemployment rate 
(in deviations with respect to the sample mean), the sectoral composition of activity in the 
province (relative employment weights of agriculture, industry, construction and services 
sectors), and the temporary employment rate (proportion of employees with fixed-term 
contracts out of the total number of employees), the presence of big firms, the incidence 
of collective dismissals (Expediente de Regulación de Empleo (EREs) in the Spanish legal 
terminology), and firm profitability. The presence of big firms in the province (per year) is 
calculated as the proportion of companies with more than 200 workers over the total num-
ber of companies according to the information collected by the Central Business Register 
(DIRCE) of the National Statistics Institute.12 As for the incidence of collective dismissals, 
we use the number of collective dismissal files and the number of workers affected, from 
data registered at the Ministry of Employment and Social Security. Firm profitability is 
measured by the lowest decile in the distribution of the return on assets (ROA) at each prov-
ince using as a source the Bank of Spain Central Balance Sheet database. Conceivably, firms 
with lower profitability are most likely to initiate economic dismissals.
Table 1 provides the data definitions and sources. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics 
before 2010, 2010–2012, and after 2012.13 The proportion of firings declared as fair by labor 
courts is on average 25.9% for the whole sample and decrease from 27.3% before 2010 to 25.8% 
in 2010–2012 and 22.7% after 2012, with noticeable differences across provinces (see Figure 3 
and Table 3). Also interestingly, this proportion is negatively correlated with the local unem-
ployment rate (see column 3 in Table 5). We interpret this correlation as an indication that the 
local unemployment rate affects directly labor court decisions (see Appendix).
3.2 Empirical approach
Variation across time and labor courts with controls by labor court and provincial character-
istics allows us to make inferences on the effects of EPL reforms on labor court rulings and on 
the incidence of settlements.
11 Following García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2015), the congestion rate at each province and quarter is defined 
as the ratio between the sum of pending cases (measured at the beginning of the quarter) plus new cases in a specific 
quarter and the cases solved in the same quarter. In Spain, this ratio is frequently above one.
12 This variable may proxy for the potential effect of trade unions at supporting workers’ claims and settlements of labor 
courts.
13 At the aggregate level, the proportion of economic dismissals over all firings increased up to 2013 to decline afterward 
(see Figure 2).
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Table 1 Definitions of variables and sources of data
Variable Definition Scale/Unit Period Source
Court rulings Percentage of labor court 
judgments ruling that the  
dismissal was fair or justified
% By court, 
2004–2015
CGPJ
D1 (Reform 2010) Period of enforcement of the 
2010 labor market reform
Dummy 2004–2015 Self elaboration
D2 (Reform 2012) Period of enforcement of the 
2012 labor market reform
Dummy 2004–2015 Self elaboration
Unemployment rate Percentage of total workforce 
which is unemployed and is 
looking for a paid job (in  
differences from the average)
% By province, 
2004–2014
Spanish National  
Statistics Institute (INE)
Profitability Return on assets (ROA) for the 
10% of firms with a lower ROA





Percentage of total workforce 
which has a fixed-term contract
% By province, 
2004–2014
Spanish National  
Statistics Institute (INE)
Log of the number 
of workers under 
collective dismissals
Logarithm of the number of 
workers affected by collective 
dismissals
Logarithm By province, 
2004–2014
Ministry of Employ-
ment and Social 
Security
Proportion of com-
panies with more 
than 200 employees
Proportion of companies with 
more than 200 employees over 
the total number of  
companies
% By province, 
2004–2014




Percentage of total workforce 
working on services sector
% By province, 
2004–2014




Percentage of total workforce 
working on services sector
% By province, 
2004–2014




Percentage of total workforce 
working on services sector
% By province, 
2004–2014




analyzed (+) by 
professional judges 
over total
Percentage of labor court 
judgments ruling that the 
dismissal was fair or justified 
by professional judges over all 
the dismissal lawsuits ana-
lyzed by all judges
% By court, 
2004–2015
CGPJ 
Proportion of days 
with temporary  
positions at the  
labor courts per year
Proportion of days per  
365-days a year with positions 
at the labor courts held by 
interim judges 






Ratio between the sum of 
pending cases in a labor court 
plus new cases and the cases 
resolved in the same quarter 




rate (pre-trial  
settlements)
Ratio between the sum of 
pending settlements in a labor 
court plus new settlements 
and the settlements resolved 
in the same quarter 





Ratio of the number of out-of-
court settlements divided by 
the sum of those settlements 
and the total number of  
dismissal lawsuits
% By court, 
2004–2015
CGPJ 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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As discussed above, labor market reforms of 2010 and 2012 affected red tape costs and 
procedures of economic dismissals and disciplinary layoffs differently. Hence, the incidence 
of economic dismissals and disciplinary layoffs and the selection of both conflicts into settle-
ments and litigation are likely to have changed as a result of the reforms. Given that we do not 
observe economic dismissals and disciplinary layoffs separately, we perform an event study 
(comparisons before and after) with a set of controls that proxy the incidence and composi-
tion (economic dismissals versus disciplinary layoffs) of firings. Thus, we regress the ratio of 
labor court rulings stating that the dismissal/layoff is fair and the proportion of settlements 
on time dummies that capture the entry into force of the EPL reforms and a group of relevant 
controls that vary by time (at the quarterly frequency), by labor court, and by province (also 
including fixed effects by province). All models are estimated both fitting a linear specifica-
tion and odds-ratios (Bishop et al., 1975; Williamson et al., 1995).14 Errors in all models are 
clustered at the provincial level, and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.
Among the covariates, we specifically focus on the local (provincial) unemployment rate 
and the local (provincial) profitability of firms (the two variables that may directly influence 
judges’ decisions on economic dismissals according to our model), and interact both with the 
time dummies indicating the timing of the reforms. These interactions should capture by how 
much judges’ discretion on rulings changes with the EPL reforms.
Thus, we estimate
 
Y X D D Uist s
k
K
k kist st st
1
1 1 2 2 3 4∑α δ β β β β= + + + + + Π +
=
 D U D D U D* * * *st st st st ist5 1 6 1 7 2 8 2β β β β ε( ) ( )( ) ( )+ + ∏ + + ∏ +
14 We only report OLS results though, since estimated probabilities are not significantly different.
Figure 2  Proportion of economic dismissals over all dismissals.
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment.
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data provided by the CGPJ.
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where Yist is, alternatively, the settlement ratio and the proportion of labor court rulings declar-
ing the dismissal/conflict fair at labor court i province s, and time t; Xkist is the set of controls 
that includes the proportion of employees with temporary contracts, the sectoral distribution 
of employment (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and services), the proportion of 
establishments with more than 200 employees, the number of employees affected by collective 
dismissals (in logs), the proportion of dismissal conflicts ruled by professional judges, days 
covered by temporary judges at the labor court per year, and the judicial congestion rate at 
labor court i, province s, and time t; and Ust and ∏st are, respectively, the unemployment rate 
and the lowest decile of the distribution of firm profit rates15 at province s and time t. D1 and D2 
are time dummies that take value one after the second quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 
2012, respectively, the dates at which reforms came into effect. Regressions also include fixed 
province effects, αs. Controlling by characteristics of labor courts (status of the judge, interim 
days at the labor court) should take care of changes that might have affected the rulings other 
than the EPL reforms.
3.3 Results
The main results are displayed in Tables 4 (settlements) and 5 (likelihood of a labor court ruling 
declaring the dismissal/layoff as fair).
While the 2010 reform led to some significant decrease in the likelihood of settle-
ments, the 2012 reform had the opposite effect. Overall, the proportion of settlements is 
about 7% to 10% points higher after 2012 (columns 5 and 6). Settlements are less likely the 
higher the local unemployment rate and the lower firm profitability are. Interestingly, the 
association between the incidence of settlements and local unemployment became positive 
after the 2010 reform and negative again after the 2012 reform. Under our interpretation 
of the coefficients of these variables as the divergence between employer and employees 
expectations on labor court rulings, these results suggest that the reforms reduced this 
divergence both overall and, particularly, when local labor market conditions and firm 
profitability were worse.16
Another conclusion from the estimated changes in the likelihood of settlements is that dis-
missal conflicts being solved by labor court trials after the reforms are those in which employ-
ers’ expectations on the probability of a fair ruling increased by more and above dismissed 
workers’ expectations. We cannot see why this should happen in the case of disciplinary layoffs 
(whose regulation was unchanged). Thus, by joining this to the observation that the overall 
proportion of firings initiated as economic dismissals was higher after the reform, we conclude 
that, if anything, the proportion of economic dismissals out of all firing conflicts solved by 
labor courts ought to have increased. An increase in the weight of economic dismissals being 
solved by trial in the labor courts and the broadening of the definition of fair causes of eco-
nomic dismissals should weight positively in the likelihood of firings being ruled as fair by the 
labor courts.
However, Table 5 shows that the proportion of dismissals/layoffs being ruled as fair 
increased immediately after the 2010 reform but was not very much changed with the 2012 
15 ROA according to the Bank of Spain database.
16 It is also noteworthy that the judicial congestion rate increased the likelihood of settlements (not shown in Table 4).
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reform. In fact, under the most complete specifications (columns 5 and 6), neither of the 
two reforms seem to have a significant effect on the rulings. An increase in the unemploy-
ment rate of 10% points is associated with a decrease in the proportion of fair rulings of 
approximately 3% to 5% points. As for firm profitability, there is no statistically significant 
association with judges’ rulings, once that other covariates controlling for incidence and 
composition of firings are included Nevertheless, after the 2010 reform, it seems that judges’ 
decisions took more into account the economic situation of the firm, so that lower profitabil-
ity led to a higher probability of a fair ruling (effect that is not observed after the 2012 reform, 
somehow surprisingly).
To better gage the impact of the EPL reforms on labor court rulings, in Figure 4, we plot 
the observed probability of a dismissal/layoff being ruled as fair by the labor court and the 
change in that probability due to EPL reforms and their effects through interactions with the 
local unemployment and firm profitability (using estimates from column 5 in Table 5). While 
this marginal effect increased immediately after the 2010 reform (but only by about 2.5% 
points), after the 2012 reform, it decreased by 3% points (although this negative effect was van-
ishing gradually up to 2015). With these results we conclude that effective firing costs were not 
significantly reduced by the widening of the scope for economic dismissals associated with the 
Spanish EPL reforms of 2010 and 2012.
4 Concluding remarks
Labor courts’ intervention on dismissal cases is key for the determination of effective firing 
costs. Since judges often behave as socially motivated agents and have some discretion in the 
application of EPL, the parties (employers and dismissed employees) act strategically taking 
into account the procedural rules for the initiation and resolution of dismissal conflicts. As a 
result, there are several channels by which EPL affects effective firing costs and the conse-
quences of EPL reforms may be different than intended.
We analyze two significant EPL reforms in 2010 and 2012 than changed both severance 
payments and procedural rules in Spain to make economic dismissals less costly. Even though 
the proportion of economic dismissals over all firings increased, the average probability that a 
dismissal was declared fair by a labor court did not increase significantly, despite the widening 
of the fair causes of economic dismissals. By controlling for local labor market conditions, 
diminishing firm profitability, and reduction of severance payments for unfair dismissals, we 
identify the effects of EPL reforms on labor courts’ ruling on firing conflicts. We conclude that 
the reduction of effective firing costs in Spain after 2010 took place mainly because of the lower 
severance payments for unfair dismissals and less so due to the extension of the fair causes of 
economic dismissals.
This conclusion has three implications for the policy debate on the need of introducing 
further labor market reforms. One is that the reduction in effective firing costs has been lower 
than the one intended by the legislated EPL reforms. Second, and similarly, the changes in the 
indicators about the stringency of EPL for regular contracts usually discussed in the debate 
(for instance the OECD indicators) overestimate the impact of the EPL reforms, since they 
are based on changes in legal costs and neglect the costs from enforcement (i.e., labor courts’ 
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intervention). Finally, the reduction of effective firing costs for economic dismissals under the 
regular employment contract has not been as large as envisioned by the policy-makers. Given 
that the difference between these firing costs and termination costs of temporary contracts, 
which determines the proportion of employees with fixed-term contracts, is still very large, the 
high incidence of temporary employment observed in Spain would not be very much reduced 
by these reforms.
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Figure 4  Marginal effect of reforms, unemployment, and profitability on labor court 
rulings declaring dismissals/layoffs as fair.
Note: Proportion of fair rulings by labor courts (observed values) is measured in left axis and 
marginal effect (from estimates in column 5 in Table 5) on the right axis.
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Appendix
A.1 A theoretical model of effective firing costs
The model aims at showing how effective firing costs are affected by both severance payments 
established by EPL and costs associated with procedural rules.17 The most important message 
to be drawn is that, due to strategic behavior by employers and fired employees, the composi-
tion of firing cases (disciplinary layoffs versus economic dismissals), both initiated and termi-
nated by labor courts’ rulings, is affected by relative severance payments and procedural costs 
in each case and by their expectations of the labor courts’ rulings. Hence, EPL reforms may 
affect effective firing costs by several channels, not only by changes in severance payments.
We set up the model to resemble the main features of EPL and labor courts in Spain as 
described earlier, but it can be adapted to similar cases of labor court interventions prevailing 
in other countries and to studies of the effects of EPL reforms changing the procedural rules for 
dismissals (as those that recently took place in Italy and France). The model is in the spirit of 
recent analysis in the literature about litigation and settlements (see Klerman et al., 2018), with 
some (non-substantial) shortcuts and modifications that we explain below.
The assumptions are as follows:
• Agents’ actions: Employers (e), having decided to dismiss a worker (w), justify the dis-
missal as an economic dismissal (r) or as a disciplinary layoff (d). Upon firing, employers 
make an offer to the dismissed employees to settle the case before going to a labor court. 
There is sequential bargaining (employers’ proposals followed by workers’ counterpropos-
als). If settlement is not reached, a labor court rules on the fairness of the dismissal/layoff, 
and severance payments are paid according to the ruling.18
• Judges’ behavior: For dismissals {r,d} brought to a labor court, a judge rules if they are 
fair ( f  ) or unfair (u). Judges observe the true profitability of the firm (π) and whether 
dismissed workers were shirking or not. Hence, they always rule untruthful dismissals/
layoffs as unfair. However, they are driven by a social motivation that generates some 
uncertainty about the likelihood of a fair ruling when the alleged cause of the dismissal 
is truthful.19 Inspired by some empirical findings discussed in Section 3, we assume 
that social motivation leads judges to rule dismissals as unfair with a higher likelihood 
when local labor market conditions (µ) worsen.20 Furthermore, following the spirit of 
the regulation of economic dismissals, we assume that the more likely they are to be 
ruled as fair, the lower the profitability of the firm (π) is. We denote the probability of 
a truthful economic dismissal being ruled as fair by the labor court by x , ,r π µ( )  with 
x x( , / ) 0 and ( , / ) 0.r rπ µ π π µ µ( ) ( )∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ <  The probability of a truthful disciplinary 
17 For an early survey of models of legal disputes and their resolution, see Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989).
18 Klerman et al. (2018) assumed alternative bargaining regimes, all of them nonsequential. Under sequential bargaining, 
each party updates its beliefs learning from the other party’s offers. This makes the characterization of close-form 
solutions much harder, but we can still shed some insights on how the composition of firings solved by litigation 
changes with EPL reforms of several types.
19 Since we cannot observe the individual characteristics of each dismissal case and we only have limited information 
about the characteristics of the judges, a more ambitious modeling of the judges’ behavior would not help us very much 
in the interpretation of the empirical results.
20 Klerman et al. (2018) assumed that the merit of a dispute is represented by a random variable and the court observes 
it without error, so that the plaintiff wins the case with positive probabilities depending on a threshold value for the 
realization of the random variable. In our setup, the judge only observes the true nature of the firing (whether truthful 
or disguised) but still his or her decision depends on the state of the local labor market and firm profitability.
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layoff being ruled as fair by the labor court does not depend on firm profitability but only 
on local labor market conditions: x ,d µ( )  with dx d( ( ))/ 0d µ µ < . For untruthful dismiss-
als, xd = xr = 0. There are red tape costs (court costs to be paid only by employers) that are 
higher for economic dismissals than for disciplinary layoffs (τ j, j = {r,d}, with τ τ>r d). 
Severance payments are as follows:
Fair dismissal Unfair dismissal
Economic dismissals cf cu
Disciplinary layoffs 0 cu
• Agents’ expectations: For some dismissals to be settled at labor courts, we assume that 
employers and dismissed workers have divergent expectations on labor courts’ rulings. 
The expected probabilities that firings are ruled as fair are xij, where j denotes the type of 
dismissal (j = {r,d}) and i the agent holding that expected probability (i = {e,w}). Employers 
support their expectations on firm profitability, local market conditions, and employees’ 
shirking state.21 Workers hold their expectations knowing local market conditions, their 
shirking state, and the employer’s decision on whether to justify the dismissal as an eco-
nomic dismissal or as a disciplinary layoff.22 In Klerman et al. (2018), each party’s expec-
tations are the result of observing a signal about the merit of the dispute. We assume that 
parties know the merit of the dispute (whether truthful of disguised) but still the judge 
decision may vary with the local market state and firm profitability.
Table A1 gives what the firms expects to pay (FEP) and what the worker expects to get 
(WEG) if the dismissal conflict is solved by a judge.
A.2 Settlements
Settlements may arise after several rounds of proposals by the employers about severance pay-
ments and workers’ counterproposals.23 Notice that in the case of economic dismissals, the 
worker’s expectations of a fair ruling is also affected by the signal sent by the employer about 
21 For a model of dismissal conflicts with imperfect monitoring, see Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2003).
22 That dismissed workers do not observe firm profitability is the source of asymmetric information in the sequential 
settlement game. Employers’ uncertainty on the probability of a fair ruling may arise from judges being of different 
types regarding their leaning toward social motivations.
23 Alternative models of settlements are presented in Daughety and Reinganum (2012).
Table A1 Severance payments in the theoretical model
FEP WEG
Economic dismissals
Truthful π µ π µ τ( ) ( )+ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +x c x c, 1 ,er f er u r µ µ( ) ( )+ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦x c x c1wr f wr u
Disguised as disciplinary cu + τ d cu
Disciplinary layoffs
Truthful µ τ( )−⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +x c1 ed u d µ( )−⎡⎣ ⎤⎦x c1 wd u
Disguised as economic cu + τ r cu
FEP, firms expects to pay; WEG, worker expects to get.
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firm’s profitability when justifying the dismissal as an economic dismissal. In this game, the 
highest severance payment that the employer is willing to offer is FEP + τ i, while the lowest 
severance payment that the worker is willing to accept is WEG + τ i.
Thus, we assume that in the settlement stage, all information about each party’s expecta-
tions is revealed (since it is a repeated game without a limitation in the number of proposals and 
counterproposals to be made). A settlement is reached whenever the employer’s expectation of 
a fair ruling is smaller than the worker’s expectation ( π µ µ( ) ( )<x x,er wr  and µ µ( ) ( )<x xed wd , 
 respectively).24 Upon settlement, effective firing costs are µ µ τ( ) ( )+ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +x c x c1wr f wr u r  for eco-
nomic dismissals and µ τ( )−⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +x c1 wd u d for disciplinary layoffs. Alternatively, if settlements 
are not reached and the case is expected to be solved by a labor court, employers’ expected 
firing costs are π µ π µ τ( ) ( )+ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +x c x c, 1 ,er f er u r  for truthful economic dismissals and 
µ τ( )−⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +x c1 ed u d for truthful disciplinary layoffs.
As for untruthful dismissals, since they are always ruled as unfair by judges and, hence, 
employers and workers expectations about a fair ruling are both nil, they will always be settled. 
Thus, effective firing costs are cu + τ d in the case of untruthful disciplinary layoffs and cu + τ r 
for untruthful economic dismissals.
A.3 The composition of firings
Employers’ decisions about dismissals to be initiated and the cause to be alleged for justifying 
them depend on expected effective firing costs. As for economic dismissals, employers will 
allege the true cause whenever
 µ µ τ δ π µ π µ τ δ τ{ } ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+ −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + + + −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − < +E x c x c x c x c c1 , 1 , 1wr f wr u r r er f er u r r u d  
being δ π µ µ{ }{ }( ) ( )= <x E x1 , ,r er wr  that is, the employer expectations on reaching a settle-








rβ π µ δ
τ τ




where β π µ µ π µ π µ{ }( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ −E x x x, , / ,r wr er er  measures the employer expectations on 
diverging beliefs about the probability of a fair ruling of economic dismissals. Notice that if 
δ r = 1 then β r (π, µ) > 0, and, alternatively, if δ r = 0 then β π µ( ) <, 0.r  On the contrary, economic 
dismissals are disguised as disciplinary layoffs when condition (1) is not satisfied. Thus, for 
given employer’s expectations on the likelihood of a settlement, truthful economic dismissals 
are more likely as the difference between red tape costs of economic dismissals and disciplinary 
layoffs is small, and the difference between severance payments between unfair and fair dis-
missals and the employer’s expected probability of a fair ruling is high. In addition, if employ-
ers expect that dismissed workers have a high expectation of a fair ruling, then settlements are 
more likely and expected firing costs at settlements are lower, and therefore, they will be more 
likely to initiate truthful economic dismissals as such.
24 This resembles the Landes–Posner–Gould condition for litigation. Lee and Klerman (2016) argued that this is a sufficient 
but not necessary condition for litigation.
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For disciplinary reasons to be claimed as the cause of truthful disciplinary layoffs, 
it must happen that µ τ δ µ τ δ τ{ } ( )( ) ( )−⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + + −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − < +E x c x c c1 1 1 ,wd u d d ed u d d u r  being 
δ µ µ{ }( ) ( )= <x Ex1d ed wd  This condition is always satisfied as it implies 1 ,d dβ π µ δ( )− +⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ <  
c x( )/[ , ] 0r d u erτ τ π µ( )− > , where as before β π µ µ π µ π µ{ }( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ −E x x x, , / ,d wd ed ed  is the 
corresponding employers’ expectation on the extent of divergent beliefs about the probability 
of a fair ruling of disciplinary layoffs.
Table A2 summarizes all the conditions determining the composition of dismissals, their 
resolution and the corresponding expected firing costs.
Table A3 summarizes the propositions discussed in the main text.
Table A2 Dismissals: initiation, settlements and effective firing costs
Truthful dismissals Disguised
Economic Disciplinary As economic
Initiated β π µ δ( )+ >1 ,r r Always β π µ δ( )+ ≤1 ,r r
τ τ
π µ( ) ( )>
−







π µ( ) ( )≤
−










Effective firing costs   cu + τ d
If settled
 
















Table A3 Effects of EPL reforms




Fair dismissals ↓ ↑ ↓ unchanged unchanged ↓ ↑
Unfair dismissals ↓ ↓ ↑ unchanged unchanged ↓ ↓
Cause of economic 
dismissals ↑
↑ ↓ unchanged ↓ ↓ ↑
Downturns
Firm profitability ↓ ↑ ↓ unchanged ↓ ↓ ↑
Local labor market 
conditions ↓
↓ ↑ ↓ unchanged ↑ ↓
EPL, employment protection legislation.
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A.4  Some information on the social motivation of judges acting in  
the labor jurisdiction
Information on the social motivation of judges is limited. We proxy it by gathering information 
on memberships of the associations of judges. While Spanish law prohibits a judge to join a 
political party or a trade union while he or she is on active duty, it allows association in pro-
fessional groups, which happen to have some “ideological” orientations. Currently, the major 
associations in Spain are the “Asociación Profesional de la Magistratura” (APM), “Jueces para 
la Democracia” (JpD), “Asociación Francisco de Vitoria” (FV), “Foro Judicial Independiente” 
(FJI), and the “Asociación Nacional de Jueces”. APM is perceived as conservative. JpD is con-
sidered as leftist, and FV and FJI are considered as “moderate”.
Since we have not obtained information about the association of lower level judges to 
professional associations (and, therefore, no control has been included in the regressions), we 
have built this measure for Supreme Court justices. In this regard, we observed the relative 
weight of justices of different judicial associations at the fourth chamber of the Supreme Court 
(the one that settles employment and social security conflicts). This may be representative of 
the ideological orientation of first-instance labor courts for two reasons. First, the presence 
of the various associations in the Supreme Court may be the direct consequence of the pres-
ence of these associations at lower levels. Second, Supreme Court’s decisions (jurisprudence) 
are compulsorily followed by judges at lower levels for the interpretation of the law, so that 
the survival of lower court decisions depends partially on their consistency with the Supreme 
Court’s decisions. As shown in Figure A1, the relative weight of magistrates pertaining to leftist 
associations gradually increased at the expense of conservative and moderate associations in 
the central years of our research (from 2005 until 2011) and maintained their supremacy in 
the chamber until 2014. It is conceivable that this trend was associated with an increase in the 
propensity to rule dismissal cases in favor of the employee, counteracting therefore the impact 
of the widening of fair causes for economic dismissals. If this were the case, the impact of the 
EPL reforms on labor court rulings should be upgraded by the change in the social motivation 
of judges taking place through the higher weight of leftist judges.
Figure A1 Proportion of magistrates belonging to professional associations.
Note: Magistrates of the fourth chamber of the Supreme Court.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using Memorias del Tribunal Supremo.
